Introduction
There are at least four ways of assessing the services provisions of preferential trade agreements (PTAs):
• evaluating the rules;
• evaluating the commitments made under those rules;
• evaluating the extent to which the commitments constrain or change the status quo,
given that there can be large gaps between bound and applied protection in the areas of both services and investment;
• evaluating whether any change to the status quo has economic significance.
Those who have evaluated the services provisions of preferential trade agreements according to the first two criteria have tended to see 'donuts'. Those who have evaluated them according to the second two criteria have tended to see 'holes'.
The purpose of this paper is to outline some of the evidence according to the four methods of evaluation, and to spell out the implications for the likely effects of an Australia-China preferential trade agreement.
Evaluating the rules
The standard way of evaluating the trading rules established by the services provisions of preferential trade agreements is to compare them to the rules established by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the WTO.
The GATS imposes one key discipline on all services trade -the most-favoured nation obligation. This requires a country to treat the services suppliers of all other countries equally. There is to be no discrimination among the various different foreign sources of services.
Beyond that, there are two other key disciplines that apply on a positive list basis, ie they only apply to selected services sectors that a country chooses to subject to those disciplines. The first is a national treatment obligation. This requires a country to treat the services suppliers of all other countries the same as its domestic suppliers. There is to be no discrimination between domestic and foreign suppliers. The second is a market access obligation. This requires a country to refrain from applying six specific types of quantitative restrictions on services suppliers, be they domestic or foreign suppliers. For example, there is to be no limit on the number of services suppliers, or on the value of services transactions.
A country may choose to 'schedule' a particular services sector, thus subjecting it to both these disciplines, but it is also allowed to list any 'limitations' on the application of the disciplines, reflecting restrictive policy measures that it wishes to retain. Countries can also be selective in which modes of service delivery they will subject to these disciplines. A country can selectively 'schedule', or refrain from 'scheduling', any of the four recognised modes of delivery:
• mode 1 -'cross-border trade' -where both the producer and consumer stay in their home countries, and the services is typically delivered electronically;
• mode 2 -'consumption abroad' -where the consumer moves temporarily to the country of the producer;
• mode 3 -'commercial presence' -where the producer establishes a permanent commercial presence in the country of the consumer;
• mode 4 -'the movement of natural persons' -where the producer moves temporarily to the country of the consumer.
By recognising all these modes of services delivery, the GATS recognises that services transactions typically occur face to face, behind the border of the producing or consuming country. But under the positive list approach, countries have a great deal of discretion in whether to subject their services sectors to the disciplines of national treatment and market access in practice.
The GATS also recognises that services are an area where market failures can occur. For example, there is a legitimate role for regulation of natural monopoly in some network industries, for regulation to protect against information asymmetries in the professions, for prudential regulation of financial services to ensure systemic stability, and for safety regulation in air passenger transport.
The GATS recognises the right of individual governments to regulate. Non-economic objectives can be pursued, for example, through universal service obligations. Services provided by governments are quarantined. But GATS also requires that domestic regulatory regimes be the 'least burdensome' necessary to achieve their objectives. This provides a further WTO discipline on non-discriminatory measures that fall outside of the narrow scope of GATS 'market access' commitments, although the discipline is rather loose, especially since the definition of 'least burdensome' has yet to be decided by WTO members.
There is a presumption that the services provisions of PTAs will be GATS-plus. That is, they will impose rules at least as liberal as the GATS, and impose them on at least as many sectors. In part, this presumption is written into the GATS itself. For the services provisions of PTAs to be WTO-consistent, they need to have 'substantial sectoral coverage', and provide for the absence or elimination of 'substantially all discrimination', in the sense of the national treatment obligation. But note that there is no WTO requirement for PTAs to address non-discriminatory market access limitations, or to address domestic regulation. And enforcing WTO consistency has proved no easier in services than it has in goods.
In practice, when PTAs have included services provisions, they have tended to be of two types. GATS style agreements have included national treatment and market access obligations for services on a positive list basis. And they have included investment provisions only via the treatment of commercial presence in the services sector. By contrast, NAFTA style agreements have included national treatment and market access obligations for services on a negative list basis. That is, the obligations apply to all services sectors, except those nominated for exclusion in an annex of reservations and exceptions. And they have typically included a separate chapter on investment that imposes most-favoured nation and national treatment obligations on investment in all sectors (again, subject to reservations and exceptions), not just in services.
Both types of agreements cover obligations to facilitate the temporary movement of individual services suppliers, since this is one of the modes by which services are delivered. Some agreements of either type may also include a separate chapter on the movement of business persons. Such chapters may outline obligations such as limits on the use of economic needs tests for immigration purposes. These obligations typically apply to all business persons, not just services suppliers.
There are many more aspects to the rules governing services in the GATS and in PTAs.
Good detailed discussion of all aspects is contained in three OECD documents (OECD 2002a (OECD , 2002b (OECD , 2002c , which examine the relationship between PTAs and the multilateral trading system for services, investment and labour mobility.
The discussion in those papers has been used to devise a template for scoring the services, investment and labour mobility provisions of PTAs. The purpose is to compare PTAs with each other and with multilateral disciplines under the WTO (not just the GATS agreement, but other relevant agreements such as the WTO agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures).
The templates for evaluating these dimensions of PTAs are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 . The top section of each template has been designed to compare agreements at the rule-making stage. Thus the top section of each template contains categories and scores for ranking the form of the agreement, as indicated in the relevant chapters.
The templates also contain a few broad summary measures to compare the levels of commitments contained in each agreement. Thus the bottom section of each template contains categories and scores for ranking the content of the agreement, as indicated in the relevant annexes of commitments, reservations or exceptions. However, the measures of content are relatively crude.
The first template deals with cross-border trade (defined as modes 1 and 2), but also picks up some of the more general features that appear in services chapters, such as provisions to deal with domestic regulation and monopolies. This template refers primarily to the services chapters of the agreements.
The second template deals with investment (defined as mode 3 plus portfolio investment). It notes whether agreements deal with investment in services only, or more generally. It also covers some of the issues such as investment protection that are peculiar to investment. This template captures the content of the services, investment, and possibly the dispute settlement chapters of the agreements.
The third template deals with the movement of people (defined as mode 4), but also picks up whether there are additional measures in the agreements to facilitate labour mobility, either for service providers, investors, or more generally. This template captures the content of the services, investment, and labour mobility chapters of the agreements.
These templates have been used to score all of the major agreements involving a preselected list of 73 countries in the years up to 2004. The 66 agreements, and their country membership, are shown in Table 4 . Most of these agreements have been notified to the WTO, but some have not. The templates have also been used to score comparable WTO disciplines, where they exist. It was not possible to give a general score for the content dimension of the WTO agreements, as this depends on the commitments of each individual member country. Each agreement, whether a PTA or a WTO agreement, is given a score between 0 and 1 against each characteristic, where 0 is most restrictive and 1 most liberal. Summaries of the scoring exercise are shown on Tables 5 to 7.
The scoring shows that in virtually all dimensions, PTAs have become more liberal over time, and with fewer exclusions. This is shown by the average scores across PTAs being higher for later subgroups of agreements than they are for the sample as a whole.
In many dimensions, PTAs are not as liberal on average as WTO agreements. This is only in part because the sample of PTAs includes agreements that have no substantive services provisions at all (note that it would involve selection bias to exclude such agreements from the sample). It is also because many PTAs are silent on issues such as domestic regulation, monopolies, private business practices, safeguards and subsidies. These are not areas where PTAs have forged ahead of WTO disciplines. But on the two core issues of market access and national treatment, PTAs are now more liberal on average than the WTO. This is largely because of the growing list of agreements that include these disciplines on a negative list rather than positive list basis.
Other writers have suggested that on core rules, at least, PTAs are generally GATS-plus.
Stephenson (2002) has argued that the NAFTA-style agreements that characterise PTAs in the Western Hemisphere outperform the GATS in three key respects. First, the negative list approach promotes transparency. Second, she argues that it precludes the possibility of making binding commitments that lag actual practice (an assessment that will be examined in more detail in a later section), and hence promote stability. Finally, she argues that they promote more liberal commitments than the GATS, an assessment that is now examined in more detail.
Evaluating the commitments
Again, the standard way of evaluating the trade commitments made under the services provisions of preferential trade agreements is to compare them to commitments made under the GATS.
It is often simply asserted that because negative list PTAs commit to market access and national treatment in all services sectors and modes of delivery except those specifically excluded, they must be more liberalising than GATS schedules or positive list PTAs, which only commit to market access and national treatment in specifically nominated sectors. In principle, however, it is possible for a negative list agreement to be no more liberalising than a positive list one, if the annexes of reservations and exceptions are sufficiently long. And some lists are quite long -Singapore's lists of reservations and exceptions in its negative list agreement with the United States run to 71 pages.
Accordingly, a definitive assessment requires a careful sector-by-sector and mode-bymode comparison of the commitments actually made in PTAs, both positive and negative list, against the commitments made in GATS schedules. An early comparison along these lines was made by Dee (2005a) , who compared the negative list commitments made by Australia and the United States in the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) with their positive list commitments under the GATS. The assessment concluded that the areas of overlap were considerable. AUSFTA did go further than GATS commitments, but the areas of additional market opening were relatively minor, and not generally in areas where there were significant barriers to begin with. This was consistent with the claim by the Australian Government that the major achievement of AUSFTA in the areas of services and investment was to prevent the introduction of any new discriminatory measures, rather than to roll back any existing ones.
A more widespread comparison along these lines has been done by Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2006) . The authors compared the commitments undertaken by 29 WTO Members (counting the EC as one) under mode 1 (cross-border supply) and mode 3 (commercial presence) in 28 PTAs negotiated since 2000, and compared these with both the prevailing GATS commitments and recent Doha Round offers of these countries.
The authors agree with the above assessment that PTAs appear to offer limited value added over GATS disciplines in the areas of rules governing safeguard mechanisms, subsidies, domestic regulation and the like. Their main contribution appears to be in their levels of commitments.
On commitments, the authors find that PTAs tend to go significantly beyond GATS offers in terms of improved and new bindings. Further, the proportion of new/improved commitments is generally much greater in PTAs (compared to GATS offers) than in GATS offers (when compared to existing GATS commitments). Some countries are described as showing spectacular improvements in their PTA commitments. Among them are countries that have signed a PTA with the United States. On average, these now have mode 1 and mode 3 commitments in more than 80 per cent of services sub-sectors, compared to commitments in less than half of services sub-sectors in their GATS schedules/offers.
In most cases where PTA commitments improve on WTO commitments, it is primarily through new bindings rather than through improvements on existing bindings. Arguably, though, the commitments are more likely to imply real liberalisation in the latter case than in the former. Exceptions to the general trend include China and India, whose PTA commitments (China's with Hong Kong and Macao, India's with Singapore) tend to take the form of improvements to sectors already committed under GATS schedules/offers rather than new bindings, and are mostly limited to mode 3.
The authors find that the countries that have a smaller proportion of new/improved commitments in PTAs have all used the positive list scheduling approach. This is not to say that all positive list agreements have led to lesser commitments than negative list ones. China's agreements with Hong Kong and Macao were positive list agreements that nevertheless provided significant new commercial opportunities. But those countries such as Australian and Singapore that have signed agreements of both types have made greater commitments in their negative list ones.
Finally, the authors note that PTAs have provided for advances both for sectors that have tended to attract fewer offers in the GATS (eg audiovisual, road, rail, postal-courier), as well as for sectors that were already popular targets for GATS offers (eg professional, financial services). One exception was health services, where PTA commitments did not appear to go significantly beyond GATS offers.
Overall, the authors conclude (p. 33) that 'PTAs generally have provided for significant improvements over GATS commitments, sometimes even leading to real liberalisation of the market'.
Evaluating the extent of real liberalization
Comparing PTA commitments to actual regulatory policies to evaluate the extent of real liberalisation is even more labour-intensive than comparing positive and negative list agreements. And it generally cannot be done in a mechanical fashion, because information about regulatory policies and the reasons for regulatory changes is spread unevenly around different sources. The sources need to be read and interpreted carefully, and there is still a danger that the results of any comparison will reflect paucity of information rather than anything else.
One recent such comparison has capitalised on a pre-existing database of actual regulatory practice that was complied for a different purpose. Barth et al. (2006) make use of a database on actual regulatory practice in banking as it stood around 2000, as reported in responses to a detailed World Bank survey. The database had been used previously to assess the impact of that regulation on banking performance (eg Barth, Caprio and Levine 2004) . In the more recent exercise, Barth et al. (2006) compare regulatory practice with actual WTO commitments in the financial sector for 123 WTO Members.
The authors find significant differences between commitments and actual practice. Some of their examples are as follows.
• More than 30 WTO Members that prohibit foreign firms from entering through acquisitions, subsidiaries or branches in their WTO schedules allow such entry in practice.
• Six WTO Members do not allow foreign entry through subsidiaries or branches even though in their schedules they indicated they do. This anomaly may reflect the 'prudential carveout' in the GATS, whereby Members are not required to schedule limitations maintained for prudential purposes. However, it is highly questionable whether bans on foreign entry could be defended as purely prudential measures.
• A large number of WTO Members prohibit banks from engaging in insurance or securities activities in their schedules, but allow such activities in practice.
• 26 WTO Members in practice set the same minimal capital entry requirements for domestic and foreign banks, even though in their schedules they do not commit to such non-discriminatory treatment.
The authors also look for evidence of statistically significant correlations between WTO commitments and regulatory practice. Even if the two do not match exactly, they expect the correlation to be positive. However, their finding does not bear this out.
The results in Table 12 indicate that on average countries are more open based on actual practice than their WTO commitments. The difference in means between actual practice and commitments, moreover, is statistically significant. Also, there is no significant correlation between actual practice and commitments. These results hold for developing countries and countries with more than 2 million people, but not for the developed countries. The latter group of countries is on average less open based upon actual practice than commitments. (Barth et al. 2006, p. 25) This last, rather explosive finding passes without further comment!
The authors also try to explain the gap between commitments and actual practice. One of their findings is that countries with greater foreign ownership of total bank assets also tend to have the biggest divergence between the indices for commitments and actual practice. Countries with greater foreign ownership also tend to display less actual discrimination against foreign banks, but tend to display more discrimination based on commitments. Lastly, developed countries that made commitments earlier in time tend to display less discrimination, while the opposite is the case for developing countries.
In general, therefore, the authors find many instances where WTO commitments are significantly less liberal than actual practice. They also find instances where WTO commitments are more liberal than actual practice, particularly in developed countries.
As evidence about whether PTAs promote real liberalization, the findings are merely circumstantial. However, if WTO commitments lag actual practice by a significant margin, then even if PTAs improve significantly on WTO commitments, they may still themselves lag actual practice. (2002)). And one of the recent PTAs to contain no services commitments whatsoever is that between ASEAN and China.
Evaluating the economic significance real PTA liberalisation 1
It is sometimes claimed that because services trade barriers do not involve tariff revenue, that preferential services trade liberalisation cannot impose losses on PTA members through trade diversion. This claim is made explicitly by Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2006) , in their otherwise excellent paper, and is implied by the modeling treatment of services in papers such as Hertel (2000) . The argument is fallacious, for the following reasons.
Some regulatory trade restrictions, particularly quantitative restrictions, create artificial scarcity. The prices of services are inflated, not because the real resource cost of producing them has gone up, but because incumbent firms are able to earn economic rents -akin to a tax, but with the revenue flowing to the incumbent rather than to government. Liberalisation of these barriers would yield relatively small gains associated with better resource allocation, but also have redistributive effects associated with the elimination of rents to incumbents. Such rent-creating restrictions are tariff-like, with the redistribution of rent having effects similar to the redistribution of tariff revenue.
Alternatively, services trade restrictions could increase the real resource cost of doing business. An example would be a requirement for foreign service professionals to retrain in a new economy, rather than to pass an accreditation process. Liberalisation would be equivalent to a productivity improvement (saving in real resources), and yield relatively large gains. This could increase returns for the incumbent service providers, as well as lowering costs for users elsewhere in the economy.
This distinction has two important implications. First, the gains from liberalising costescalating barriers is likely to exceed the gains from liberalising rent-creating barriers by a significant margin. Secondly, in the context of PTAs, the danger of net welfare losses from net trade diversion arises if the relevant barriers are rent-creating, since rent distribution can have the same effects as tariff redistribution (see also Pomfret 1997). So a key question for establishing the economic significance of any real services trade liberalisation achieved in PTAs is whether it targets trade barriers that create rents or raise costs.
While many PTAs go further than the GATS, they have tended to be selective in two important ways:
• they have tended to be preferential, even in the provisions that go beyond goods trade; and
• they have tended to target only those provisions that explicitly discriminate against foreigners.
There are strong political economy explanations for both of these outcomes.
With some exceptions, recent PTAs have tended to do one of two things in the new age areas (including services) -either bind the status quo, or make concessions on a preferential basis, even when logic suggests they could sensibly be made nonpreferentially.
2
One very clear reason for this outcome is that countries with strong 'offensive' interests in the Doha Round are unlikely to give away negotiating coin by making defensive concessions on a non-preferential basis within a PTA, prior to a Doha Round settlement. In particular, Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2006) note that the United States always lodges a broad exception for the market access obligation in its PTAs whose purpose is to ensure that those PTAs do not go beyond its market access obligations under the GATS.
Partly because they have been preferential, recent PTAs have tended to target only those provisions that explicitly discriminate against foreigners. This is because, in many cases, the only provisions that can feasibly be liberalised on a preferential basis are those that discriminate against foreigners.
3
But even without this feasibility constraint, there are economic and political economy forces that tend to limit concessions within PTAs to those that explicitly discriminate against foreigners. The central one is the threat to sovereignty that is felt most strongly by countries when contemplating making reforms to non-discriminatory domestic regulatory regimes as part of a trade agreement. To many countries, both developed and developing, this may be viewed as too much of a threat to the 'right to regulate'.
Negotiating modalities have also contributed a focus on provisions that explicitly discriminate against foreigners, not just in PTAs but also in the WTO. The request-andoffer modality is currently being used in the Doha negotiations on services, and is the means by which many PTAs are negotiated. Under this modality, countries are asked to contemplate, not just reforms that are in their own best interests, but reforms that are in their trading partners' best interests. It will tend to be in a trading partner's best interests to target only those provisions that explicitly discriminate against foreigners -in this way, the foreign market share is maximised. Foreign producers would generally have little interest in unleashing competition from promising domestic new entrants. They would rather join a cartel on a far more selective basis! And in these circumstances, the liberalising countries risk simply handing monopoly rents to foreigners. Indeed, this is the basis of the ASEAN desire to have safeguard provisions in the WTO services trade negotiations.
A further consideration is one of visibility. Regulatory regimes are always complex, and often not very transparent to insiders, let alone outsiders. The regulations that will tend to be visible to potential foreign entrants are those that discriminate against foreigners.
A final consideration is the requirements for WTO consistency. As noted earlier, WTO disciplines only require PTAs to remove limitations on national treatment. They do not require them to address issues of market access or domestic regulation.
But this focus on measures that discriminate against foreigners means that PTAs are not concentrating on the trade barriers that matter most in an economic sense. As noted earlier, the barriers that are easiest to liberalise on a preferential basis are explicit quantitative restrictions. These create artificial scarcity, and hence generate rents. For example, one popular target for liberalisation in PTAs has been barriers in banking and telecommunications. The limited empirical evidence suggests that in these sectors (where explicit barriers to entry are rife), barriers appear to create rents. In distribution services, where indirect trade restrictions also apply, barriers appear to increase costs. In air passenger transport and the professions, barriers appear to have both effects. In particular, discriminatory barriers in the professions appear to create rents, while the nondiscriminatory restrictions (such as restrictions that require partnerships, and require both the investors and managers of professional firms to themselves be licensed professionals) increase costs. 4 And theoretical arguments suggest that barriers in maritime and electricity generation primarily affect costs.
5 Dee (2005b) shows that if an East Asian PTA managed to eliminate all discrimination against foreigners in these sectors where empirical evidence is available, the gains would be small compared to a moderately successful completion of the Doha Round. And they would be trivial compared to a comprehensive program of unilateral regulatory reform, one that instead targeted non-discriminatory behind-the-border restrictions on competition. The reason is that there appears to be a reasonably strong correlation in practice between measures that discriminate against foreigners and measures that create rents.
What then is the source of the interest in PTAs? A major motivation by demandeur countries is to capture the first mover advantage. Given the nature of services production, with its large sunk costs, first movers have a significant advantage. Mattoo and Fink (2002) compare the effects of 'sequential entry' to 'simultaneous entry'. A PTA negotiation might give a first mover advantage to a supplier who is not competitive in world terms. The country giving the preference risks landing itself with a second class supplier who is difficult to budge.
Implications for an Australia-China free trade agreement
China comes to PTA negotiations in services from a slightly different perspective to many other countries. Its first waves of reforms in services focused on domestic regulation -converting sectors that were once monopolized by State-owned enterprises into sectors where some domestic competition could occur (Findlay and Pangestu 2004) . It then went through the process of WTO accession, a process that saw it make significant commitments on all fronts, but with an important focus on removing discrimination against foreign suppliers (see also Mattoo 2004).
Despite the significant progress, Australian services providers have found that China still has significant barriers to trade. Australian officials have compiled a list of over 100 pages of services trade barriers that they would like to target in PTA negotiations, barriers that include derogations from national treatment, limitations on market access, and restrictions imposed by China's domestic regulatory regimes. The exercise has contributed greatly to transparency in China, since coordination problems among Chinese government departments have been rife, and individual departments have been unaware of the restrictions and limitations imposed by others.
The question remains what real liberalization is likely to be achieved in practice. At the time of writing, it is unclear even whether services will be listed on a positive or a negative list basis. For its part, Australia will maintain its strategy of binding the status quo. China has so far been unwilling to include services provisions in its PTAs at all, or has been unwilling to go beyond its existing WTO accession commitments, arguing (with some cause) that these have already imposed a significant adjustment burden.
Australian officials will press China to go at least a little further. And they will press on all fronts -national treatment, market access and domestic regulation. What is significant is that they will do so on a preferential basis. They do not see themselves as negotiating on behalf of the rest of the world. Even when they make requests concerning domestic regulation, they will not be asking China to deregulate. Rather, they will ask for a waiver or an exemption of the current regulation for Australia.
Whether such preferential relaxation of domestic regulation affects rents or costs in China depends to a large extent on whether supply conditions from the Australian end are competitive (eg Panagariya 2000, Francois and Wooten 2001) . If supply conditions are competitive, then the potential cost saving for Australian producers will attract new entry to bid the prices down to match the lower costs, for the benefit of Chinese users. If the supply conditions are not competitive, then selected Australian producers may be able to pocket the cost savings, generating greater rents in Australia for no benefit to Chinese users. Given the 'client focus' of Australian trade officials, which sees them happy to negotiate on behalf of individual services suppliers, rather than necessarily ensuring open entry for all Australian suppliers, it is not difficult to conceive of situations where the latter might occur.
Either way, Australia is clearly seeking a first mover advantage for its services in China, or in some cases a second mover advantage (behind Hong Kong and Macao). The gains to China are likely to be small, although so too are the adjustment costs. What is certain is that an Australia-China Free Trade Agreement will do nothing to further the cause of domestic regulatory reform in China. At worst, it may create a subset of Australian 
